Mis-communications

[Cire 0]

I find this phenomena quite alarming...

 

The fatal Tanerife (1974) case where both B747s collided during take offs, the Zurich case (2010) where a Thai A340 and Blue Island ATR 43-300 was both lined up for departure at the same time, and the Nantes (2010)where a A318 on approach while a B737 was readied for departure almost at the same time.. was due to communications or the mis-communication of depart and landing by the controller.

 

What I am trying to point out is, isn't the current technology that we have can detect such conflicts rather than still pending on human responds cross-checks and verification?

 

 

Spain's was due to a bomb blast happened hours ago before the accident that shut down its runway lights, and put everyone in choas etc. causing various mis-que and lackness of proper departure assistance, as for the Zurich case,it was due to radio waves intersection failure where the ATR mis-heard for green for flight which was not counter-verified by FO and Control while the legitimated to depart Thai air was revving up for V1. Nantes' was due to partly a failed ILS and controller error..if i read correct.

 

Pilots are already loaded with various check-list for take off and landing, but when it comes to clearance for departure and approach, they all depended on the tower or controller to give the go no go clearance for them to depart or land. There's no one to verify or cross check the tower or controller's decisions made before instructions given to the air crafts.

 

Can the on board system in the air craft emits and pick up signals for depart and approach since it already has a collision avoidance system.

 

Any comments..?

Edited October 1, 2011 by Cire

[Cire 0]

As for aircraft taking off from the wrong runway, there are numerous cases as well. Aircraft taking off from taxi-way, and wrong runway.

 

I find it astonishing to have read about such incidence which to me should not have happened when our technologies are so much advanced now.

We can even track an aircraft from the comfort of our home, surely there is some tracking mechanism that human/auto-relay warnings of simultaneously departing or conflicting departure and arrival of aircraft to the pilot and tower.

 

Perhaps like many suggestions similar to this, differentiating departure runway light color and approach runway lights' color. Installing stop,stanby, go light bars with aircraft code sign shown, among some of the suggestion made by folks in the industry. But somehow, pilots are told to adhere to procedures, but never the other way where pilots' concerns are brought to the aviation authority? No?

Edited October 1, 2011 by Cire

[Azrin A 2]

A system to "announce" the runway exist (think it is airport dependent). KLIA has one. What those system are called, I'm hoping for someone here to explain.

 

It's a proactive measures to avoid runway errors issue Find in youtube for something like "Malaysia Airlines, taking off, cockpit, KLIA" Can't remember exactly

[Cire 0]

yeah... maybe some seniors here can enlighten us further on this system. Its good to know that such system exist and is assisting towers and pilots to fly and land safely.

Edited October 2, 2011 by Cire

[Radzi 2]

A system to "announce" the runway exist (think it is airport dependent). KLIA has one. What those system are called, I'm hoping for someone here to explain.

 

It's a proactive measures to avoid runway errors issue Find in youtube for something like "Malaysia Airlines, taking off, cockpit, KLIA" Can't remember exactly

 

It is called RAAS. MH B734 are fitted with it.

[N Azman 0]

Theres also this honeywell smartrunway and smartlanding systems that plugs in and complements the gpws. Supposed to help with situational awareness of the pilots to avoid incursions etc.

 

But nothing beats good training. all the instrumentation in the world doesnt matter when you still have pilots who doesnt keep the sterile cockpit thing going.

[Cire 0]

yes, I concurred with your opinion. Its very unfortunate that incidence of collision etc., were direct results of poor discipline in the cockpit. The lack of attention to surrounding environment that is beyond check-list ticking.

 

In many of the fatal transcripts, the same environment always present in the cockpit, that the crew in the cockpit was casually intertwining check-list procedures with non-aviation matters. They missed out crucial communications with tower or controller, assume too much, and simply complacent with the status qou of things at that moment.

[Cire 0]

When human tried to be better than artificial intelligence...

 

Jan 2011, an Air Canada Embraer ERJ-190, registration C-FHKA which was lined up for take-off noticed a land vehicle approaching it as it was cleared for take off and at that time with its brakes released for accelerations.

Denver's airport is equipped with a ASDE-X system (Airport Surface Detection Equipment model X), but it did not alert tower because it was set so not to have a "nuisance alert" for moving target (aircraft) that is having less than 40 knots speed. Since the Embraer is stationery, ASDE-X "see" no need for an alert.

 

Both controller trainee and supervisor watching did not see any vehicles on the runway before giving the aircraft the all clear to fly.

The take off was aborted by the an alert crew who saw the pairs of lights heading towards them.

Edited October 5, 2011 by Cire

[Cire 0]

Another findings of airport conflicts..

 

March,2011.

Delta Airlines Boeing 737-800, registration N3731T was cleared for line up, but put on hold as tower lost visual and radar sight of a hovering helicopter nearby. At the same time, a Trans States Embraer ERJ-145, registration N843HK was on approach and was cleared for landing by tower.

 

Tower later re-established visual contact of the helicopter and determined that there is no conflict, tower subsequently cleared the Boeing for take off without mention of the approaching Embraer. The crew of the Embraer which is now about 1/2mile from approach queried the clear for landing by the tower as the Boeing was still at the approach's end runway. At the same time, Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) alerted of the conflict and the Embraer then made a go around with just 300ft.vertical separation from the Boeing.

 

The Embraer was instructed to go around run-way heading and to climb 4,000ft.

Edited October 5, 2011 by Cire