Paul Saccani

G'day Flee, your message only says (as presented to me); "Video unavailable The uploader has not made this video available in your country" MH370: Should the search for the doomed flight continue? (nine.com.au) might be more accessible, though I imagine the video would also be geo blocked, confining it to Australia in this case. regards, Paul

When someone starts a story with "This much we know: Precisely five seconds after MH370 left Malaysia [sic] controlled airspace, someone turned off all the communications equipment and cranked the plane into a hard left turn.", it's a pretty strong sign that they don't know what they are talking about or are bald faced liars. We don't know any of this, though it does seem most likely that the aircraft was intentionally turned left, we don't know the timing with that precision, we don't know why the aircraft lost comms, we certainly can't say that someone did it. The most likely explanation is that all active generators went off line for a short time and power was not fully restored to the aircraft. If this coincided with a period of, say hypoxia, the actions of the crew may have been totally inappropriate - with no ill intent. Looking at the story in "the drive", serial 2 is arrant nonsense. Inmarsat did a subtle redesign of the way ground station data was stored to allow ranging from all data signals. Almost every word in serial 2 is false. Serial 3 continues with falsehoods. Especially laughable ones as the debris has turned up exactly where it was predicted it would turn up, if one looks back five years in this thread, you will find that I had already mentioned that a few weeks into the disappearance. It then lurches into "the only possible perpratrator" etc..., which has nothing to do with drift modelling. My money is still on an unusual failure and crew incapacitation. Hypoxic crew can act in totally bizarre ways - that's why it is so dangerous. With regard to David Gallo, I'll him speak for himself; "To the families, friends and loved ones of the NH370 victims: there is much in the media regarding the fate of the plane. Much of it I find to be irresponsible. I myself am often misquoted and I am sorry for that. My expertise is from the sea surface down to the sea floor." Of necessity, most of the southern arc has yet to be searched, and that portion which has been searched has been searched to a limited width. Given the extraordinary costs involved, a long pause is prudent to determine where the best chance of success lies. But I hope funding can be found sooner rather than later to continue the search. With regard to the statement "Five years later, we know they were wrong [about the southern arc]", that is another thing we do not know - most of it has yet to be searched. I have to say, I am nauseated by those who seek to profit by bulldusting about MH370. Gallo is not one of them.

Everyone makes mistakes - I suspect the root cause is dilution of responsibility and poor teamwork due to use of contract labour. With regard to the scorched covers, I've seen this require replacement of pitots a few times, as there is no ICA to allow for "sanding" the burnt material off. Expensive at USD22,000 each! Changing to glass fibre lined covers stopped that, but then resulted in pitot problems from broken off pies of glass fibre. These Kevlar ones look to be a good solution. Where I have more freedom, I use pitot covers that allow functionality if they are forgotten. Some have springloaded vanes, I prefer simple tubes with cross pins to prevent wasp entry, but which still allow air in.

Very interesting, thank you. According to my information it had first strike at 437 feet, which would be 133 metres, with the bulk of the wreckage finishing up at the 200 metre contour. The 200 m contour would put it a bit south of what is marked on my map as Wawasan Hill, more or less pointed to by Jalan Puteri 12/23. The approach chart gives the IAF as KAYELL, whilst the controller used KILO LIMA for the same point (the telegraphic identifier instead of the telephonic identifier. The DME identifier was India Kilo Lima, Very likely to cause further confusion. The description I have is "...descended to 437 ft AMSL before striking a ridge line just over one mile SE of the KAYELL beacon. As the aircraft hit the tree tops, it shed portions of leading and trailing edge devices plus parts of the horizontal stabiliser. The aircraft continued in controlled flight until the undercarriage struck a path halfway up the the ridge. The landing gear then sheared off and the 747 pancaked in on the top half of the ridge. As the fuel tanks ruptured, leaking fuel ignited and consumed the cockpit. Fire damage to the rest of the aircraft was minimal but it was still destroyed on impact with the ground. The wreckage came to rest on heading 295 degrees... ...one mile SE of the KAYELL NDB and nine miles from the aerodrome. " I would concur that the first strike was closer to Lestar Puchong, where it ended up is perhaps a little different. It would make sense that the fellows at the Sultan Idris Shah Forest Education Foundation would very likely have come across wreckage that is still there and could help solve the question definitively.

I make it somewhere east of Bandar Bukit Puchong, the ridge line to the east of Jalan Puteri 12/10 around the 200 metre contour line. It was on track for Subang RWY 33, so maybe follow a GPS route for that along the ridge. I've got it marked on a (1970s)TERHAD map somewhere, but an MRSO grid reference probably wouldn't help, even if I find the map. If they had descended a little later they might have gotten away with just a fright only. I can't ever imagine accepting an instruction to maintain 400 in IMC - but task fixation, trying to figure out their approach, may have prevented the insanity of that from registering.

This article is incorrect in attributing it to mud dauber wasps. The big issue, localised to BNE at the moment, is an exotic pest from South America, the Keyhole Wasp. This little bugger will block a pitot in ten to fifteeen minutes. Much research is being done by one of the operators on the special hazards of this. At BNE something resembling a pitot tree may be seen, a pole mounted with test pitot to evaluate the threat. All operators should be made aware of the unusual situation at BNE.

I know that both this post and the accident were a long time ago, but for the record, the correct phrasing in 1989, required by both ICAO and the Malaysian AIP was "descend AND MAINTAIN two THOUSAND four zero zero", emphasis added on the parts the Malaysian controller neglected to say. His explanation was that he did not say thousand (towsand) because of previous pilot confusion caused by his accent (actually mispronuciation). If the crew had of properly self briefed, had heeded the NOTAM and had proper situational awareness they would not have accepted the instruction. The shortness of the sector meant that documentation and self brief for the landing really needed to be squared away before pushback in Singapore. The Malaysia controller also neglected to correct the readback of "Okay, four zero zero", and matters were confused by four different points all being referred to phonetically as " KayEll", including, incorrectly, Kuala Lumpur aerodrome by Malaysian controllers. The crew ignored GPWS warnings, so ultimately all the defences against CFIT were breached. Most of the cause can be laid on the crew and DCA, who should never have allowed the four Kay-Ell situation to develop and should have had better training and standards for ATC. The controller should not have been allowed to normalise his deviance, but obviously must bear a fair proportion of the responsibility. This accident did not result in changed phraseology, but it did contribute momentum to the cause of E-GPWS, reduction of false warnings so that pilots did not get in the habit of ignoring them, as this crew so clearly did.

Indeed there is - this is within the predicated time and place of drift of the debris of a crash in the southern arc. Drift modelling also suggests that some debris may land on Western Australian shores too, if it remains afloat long enough. These finds are what we expected to happen. Regards, Paul

Not much, to be honest. The nature of these batteries and their specification means that there is considerable excess capacity. It might be degraded by as much as 10% below the minimum service requirement. But probably not. Worse case, a few days short of the pinging requirement. But most likely, it would still have delivered the 30 day requirement. However, due to the over specification, a new battery would have exceeded it, giving more chance for location. As a result of the AF477 crash, there is a current technical discussion about increasing the minimum requirement for public transport flights in maritime areas, to 90 days, and to the addition of a long range, shorter duration transponder to allow for localisation. Clearly, this could only have helped in the current search, and this will no doubt add to the case for this to be done.

It was written by Geoffery Thomas, the West Australian's aviation reporter. I don't have the West's version, but I do have a media release which is almost word for word the same. http://medianet.com.au/releases/release-details?id=817788 MH370: Malaysia ignored crucial evidence Perth, Australia (December 15, 2014) Malaysian authorities rebuffed satellite evidence Critical days were lost in the search for MH370 because Malaysian authorities initially rejected evidence from the British satellite company that the Boeing 777 with 239 aboard was in the Southern Indian Ocean. British sources told AirlineRatings.com Editor Geoffrey Thomas that within 24 hours of the disappearance of MH370 on March 8, Inmarsat advised the relevant Malaysian authorities of their findings but were rebuffed. “They didn’t want to know,” said the source. AirlineRatings.com Editor Geoffrey Thomas said that the revelation was “deeply disturbing and adds to the disbelief over the initial search and investigation” into the disappearance of MH370. “It is little wonder there are so many conspiracy theories,” noted Mr Thomas. “Many have said the initial search was a shambles and with the latest revelations I would have to agree.” Inmarsat then approached the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) with its data and it immediately recognized the significance. The British satellite company was contracted to provide a data link to the Malaysian Airlines fleet and continued to get a signal every hour from MH370 till 8.19am Perth time. The Malaysian authorities were forced to take the findings seriously when the AAIB teamed with Inmarsat to represent the data around March 14 – five days after the Boeing 777 disappeared. About AirlineRatings.com AirlineRatings was launched in June 2013 and rates the safety and in flight product of 450 airlines using its unique seven-star rating system. It has been used by millions of passengers from 232 countries and has become the industry standard for safety and product rating. Its safety rating system is endorsed by the International Civil Aviation Organization. For more information, contact: AirlineRatings.com Editor Geoffrey Thomas +61 41 793 6610 (24/7) Email: Geoffrey.Thomas@AirlineRatings.com You can also take a look at; MH370: Malaysia rejected evidence Geoffrey Thomas AirlineRatings.com14 Dec 2014 Critical days were lost when Malaysian authorities rejected evidence from Inmarsat just 24 hours after MH370 went missing. MAS 777 MAS 777 Initial search in Southern Indian Ocean Critical days were lost in the search for MH370 because Malaysian authorities initially rejected evidence from the British satellite company that the Boeing 777 with 239 aboard was in the Southern Indian Ocean. British sources have told AirlineRatings.com that within 24 hours of the disappearance of MH370 on March 8, Inmarsat advised the relevant Malaysian authorities of their findings but were rebuffed. “They didn’t want to know,” said the source. Inmarsat then approached the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) with its data and it immediately recognized the significance. The British satellite company was contracted to provide a data link to the Malaysian Airlines fleet and continued to get a signal every hour from MH370 till 8.19am Perth time. Those signals were picked up from its satellite 38,000km above the Indian Ocean and were relayed via a ground station in Perth. The Malaysian authorities were forced to take the findings seriously when the AAIB teamed with Inmarsat to represent the data around March 14 – five days after the Boeing 777 disappeared. It also took days before the Malaysian military radar tracking data was made available. That data showed that MH370 had changed course and flown across Malaysia toward the Andaman Sea but the search continued in the South China Sea east of the country. On March 16 the search was moved to the Southern Indian Ocean with the first aerial searches being conducted from Perth on March 18 – 10 days after the MH370 disappeared. Oceanographers agree that any chance of spotting a major debris field was lost. After ten days much of the debris that would have initially floated would have become waterlogged and sunk or been broken up in the heavy seas. And those seas and the prevailing currents would have spread the debris field far and wide. There has been much debate about the Inmarsat satellite data which is the basis of the search in the Southern Indian Ocean. However, the world’s most respected air crash investigation units the US National Transportation Safety Board, the AAIB, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau and the French BEA, as well as Boeing and Rolls Royce agree on the validity of the data. However, not everyone is convinced with a vocal critic being Sir Tim Clark President of Emirates the world’s largest international airline. In a recent exclusive interview Mr Clark told AirlineRatings.com that he believes there is an international cover-up. He warned that there has not been “full transparency of everything that everybody knows.” - See more at: http://www.airlineratings.com/news/407/mh370#sthash.MyK28dWa.dpuf Hope this helps, Paul

G'day Azman, You are misinterpreting that, AIIB took it seriously *as soon as Inmarsat contacted them*, in relation to the the second clause in the sentence, that this happened five days after the Malaysian side rejected what Inmarsat had told them. It did not take the AIIB five days to take it seriously - more like ten minutes. It is a lot clearer in the original article in the West Australian. It's an easy mistake to make, and your English is a lot better than my Malay. Regards, Paul

I'm not sure what you have in mind here, according to people who are familiar with Malaysian military radar capabilities, the capabilities haven't been overstated. At least not in the public remarks that have been made. Under the five power defence arrangements, regular use is made of Malaysian Air Defence Radars at the HQ Integrated Area Defence System, and nothing described in public is inconsistent with the performance that has been demonstrated over the years in five power exercises, such as ADEX, FLYING FISH, SUMAN WARRIOR, SUMAN PROTECTOR, BERSAMA LIMA, BERSAMA PADU, STARFISH, and most recently, BERSAMA SHIELD 2014. None of what has been stated publicly is inconsistent with the technical performance demonstrated in these exercises. Remember, the TUDM radar observations have actually been subject to public scrutiny, with the exception of the technical matters of the identification method used with non-cooperative targets (which quite correctly should not be public), and 9M-MRO was correctly identified by TUDM as it passed over the peninsula. This information was correctly passed on to the minister before 0900 on the morning of the disappearance - he elected not to inform the SAR authority, until after Inmarsat had finally been taken seriously. This is a matter of public record. I'm puzzled as to where you get the idea that Malaysia's Air Defence Radar capabilities have been overstated. To my direct knowledge, it has not been overstated. The biggest problem, outside of what actually happened on 9M-MRO, has been the actions of one man, which has made the search phase exceedingly difficult. The technical performance of the systems involved was and is more than ample to the task. Leadership seems to have been lacking at several levels. One might even say that even a shred of common sense has often been lacking at high levels. What lumps are these? How many heads have rolled? What it will achieve is a better quality of leadership. If you want to focus on the future, you can not ignore past poor performance that has not been used to improve future performance. Lessons have not been learnt. Lessons do need to be learned. Continuous improvement, rather than continuous decline is what Malaysia and Malaysians deserve. This horrific case has offered tremendous opportunities for improvement at a very expensive price in lives, treasure and lost prestige - this should not be squandered, given the heavy price already paid.

Sorry Azman, but that is not the case at all. The UK AAIB helped Inmarsat to present their information to the Malaysians as soon as they were asked to do so. It was the Malaysians that rejected the data for five days, until Inmarsat teamed with the UK AAIB to persuade them to do otherwise. The article does not say that the UK AIIB did nothing for five days, it says, quite correctly, that the Malaysians did not want to know about the data for five days, until the UK AAIB helped Inmarsat to persuade the Malaysian authorities to heed it. And all of that occurred because Immarsat took the initiative to see what they could determine with the data they had, and informed the Malaysian authorities within 24 hours of the aircraft losing contact, and then, when the Malaysian Authorities choose to reject that information, went to the AAIB in an attempt to get their data seen as the vital information that it was. In my view, the acting minister of transport, in choosing to conceal that he knew the aircraft was West of the Peninsula, as he knew at 0900 on the morning of the disappearance, and then having the search conducted to the East of Malaysia is, the say least, reckless and irresponsible.

Perhaps it is the lack of finger pointing that has caused the situation? The acting minister of transport was well aware that the aircraft had been tracked over the peninsula, with contact lost to the west of Malaysia - by 0900 that same morning. He then withheld that information from the SAR authorities. This is an action which can only be seen as irresponsible. Some may argue it to be so irresponsible as to be worthy of criminal prosecution. This deliberate withholding of information meant that not only were any survivors, if such there were, given no chance to survive, the chance of finding any debris whilst it was still floating was very slim. This individual, when questioned about why TUDM did not intercept an unresponsive large jet in Malaysian air space, stated that the only thing that interception could achieve was to shoot the aircraft down. Demonstrating any lack of competence in either the military or transport roles, both of which should be well aware of the role of military interception in assisting (rather than shooting down, which is illegal) unresponsive civil aircraft that may be in distress. What should have happened is that 9M-MRO should have been intercepted, using the procedures that every civil and military pilot is familiar with, and directed to the nearest suitable airport. Were that direction not to be followed, valuable information may yet have been gained by the intercepting aircraft as to the nature of what was going on, the search area would have been greatly reduced, and with good management and the co-operation of regional partners, the aircraft could have been tracked considerably further, perhaps even as far as the furtherest search area that has been searched to date. There is not enough finger pointing. And finger pointing is not enough.

You chaps may find this media comment interesting. http://www.abc.net.au/mediawatch/transcripts/s3998350.htm